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In_ The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
- vs -
GLEN HESS SELMAN, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Brief of Respondent 
Case No. 
10544 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
The statement contained in the appellant's brief 
adequately indicates the nature of the case. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The statement of the disposition in the appel-
lant's brief adequately sets forth the happenings in 
the lower court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent, State of Utah, submits that the 
verdict of the trial court should be affirmed. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent submits the following statemcin! 1 
of facts: ...... 
On June 9, 1965, Carol Ann Sylvester, a house 1 
wife who resided in Thatcher, Box Elder Coun+·; · 
Utah, was driving on Rocket Road in that counti· 
taking twelve children to school ITr. 10). An accider.~ 
occurred approximately four miles from Tremonto: 
at an intersection of Rocket Road which runs e:2 1 
and west with a dirt road which runs north ano · 
south (Tr. 11). The accident occurred at approximate 
1 ly 8:00 a.m. (Tr. 11). The aay was a cloudless, sunn-: 
dry, warm day with no weather imped)ments re 
visibility (Tr. 27). Mrs. Sylvester had traveled th0 1 
road on previous occasions and was going eas! : 
approximately 60 miles per hour prior to the acc1 ' 
dent (Tr. 11). There is a stop sign at the intersectic~ I 
with Rocket Road of the gravel road which control:· 
the north-south traffic. On the southwest comer~ · 
a small farmhouse with trees and corrals (Tr. !I'. I 
Mrs. Sylvester testified that as she approached th 1 
intersection, a Pontiac vehicle, which was appare~1, i 
ly driven by the appellant, ran the stop sign, ar.c 
] .. 
Mrs. Sylvester could not stop her car or even app. 
her brakes before she struck the vehicle. The le; 
front of her car struck the front area of the appellan
1
' 
vehicle (Tr. 13). It then veered off and struck an!: 
rigation ditch. As a result of the accident, Ken~; 
Okada, age 10, who was riding with Mrs. Sylvest~: 
was killed (Tr. 13). Mrs. Sylvester indica'.ed th~t~; 
had not at any time observed the car dnven Y 
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appellant south of the stop sign and that she would 
estimate the speed of the vehicle at between 45 and 
50 miles per hour when she struck the appellant's 
vehicle (Tr. 18). She said that she had seen a cloud 
of dust from the appellant's vehicle approximately 
l /8 to 1 I 4 of a mile down the dirt road that inter-
sected with Rocket Road (Tr. 19). She testified that 
no horn was sounded by the appellant (Tr. 21), and 
that the house on the corner blocks one's vision of 
the intersection (Tr. 20). The speed limit in the area 
·was 60 miles per hour. 
Highway trooper Boyd Jensen identified vari-
ous exhibits, which were photographs of the inter-
section and the vehicle, showing the extent of the 
damage (Tr. 28-29). These pictures showed tremen-
dous damage to the Dodge vehicle, which was be-
ing driven by Mrs. Sylvester, as well as the Pontiac 
vehicle driven by the appellant. Officer Jensen indi-
cated that he noted trucks around the home on the 
corner of the intersection at the time of the accident. 
He testified that he observed approximately 15 feet 
of skid marks from each vehicle into the intersec-
tion. Approximately 9 feet of the skid marks were 
on the gravel portion of the road intersecting with 
Rocket Road (Tr. 41). Officer Jensen further indicated 
that the stop sign was visible approximately 1,000 
feet away from the intersection (Tr. 52). He further 
indicated that in running a skid test, the comparable 
skid at 30 miles per hour was substantially greater 
than the skid from the appellant's car (Tr. 51). 
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Appellant's counsel brought out on cross-ez. 
amination that the appellant had been arrested b·i 
Trooper Jensen for driving during a period oi r~ 
voked license (Tr. 67), but that the charge had a" 
parently been dismissed. !-' 
Trooper Scott Lee of the Highway Patrol es:i 
mated from the physical evidence of skid and scu!: 
marks that the appellant's vehicle was going at c 
minimum speed of 40 miles per hour before hs I 
started his skid and the Sylvester vehicle at 55 miles 
per hour. A careful explanation of the difference m 
computations on the estimated speed of the Dodge 
vehicle from the testimony given by Trooper Lee 
at the time of preliminary hearing was provided al : 
trial. The difference was based upon an apparent I 
effort to make a more precise mathematical calculc· ,1 
tion (Tr. 83). Trooper Lee indicated that the appel- 1• 
lant's vehicle would have gone 641/2 feet durin; i 
the reaction period from the time appellant wouid , 
have observed the danger until the starting of his 
skid. 
The appellant's contention was that he was driv· 
ing his Pontiac going to Pocatello Valley to go !:J 
work. He had traveled the road before and knew 
of the stop sign and the intersection (Tr. 113). HE 
testified that he stopped before entering the inte:-
section, entered the intersection, and was struci 
(Tr. 113-114). On cros-examination, there was some 
indication that the appellant may have skiddee: 
into the intersection and observed the danger anc 
accelerated (Tr. 117). 
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At the close of the State's case and at the close 
oJ the trial, appellant made a motion to dismiss the 
'.'ase, which was denied by the trial judge. No ex-
ceptions were taken by the appellant to the instruc-
tions given by the court. The jury retired at 12:04 
nm. and reached a verdict at 1:03 p.m., finding the 
aooellant guilty of the crime of negligent homicide. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN 
THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT. 
The sole contention of the appellant on appeal 
1s that the evidence presented at the time of trial 
was insufficient to sustain the jury's verdict and the 
trial court's judgment. It is submitted that there is 
no merit to the appellant's position. 
It is well established that this court would be 
Justified in reversing the jury's verdict only if it 
were to conclude from a consideration of all the 
2vidence and inferences viewed in a light most 
favorable tc the jury's verdict that reasonable men 
could not have reached such a conclusion. State v. 
Berch told, 11 U.2d 208, 353 Pac. 183 (1960). It is sub-
mitted that the facts in this case are clearly sufficient 
to establish the appellant's guilt when the evidence 
18 weighed in a light most favorable to the convic-
tion. 
Negligent homicide, as defined in Section 41-6-~(~0), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, only requires 
t d, the death of an individual result within one 
Year us the proximate result of the driving of a ve-
6 
hide in "reckless disregard for the safety of others.' r 
It should be noted that the statute does not requirn 
that the vehicle be driven in reckless disregard Ci 
1 
the lives of others. The standard is merely that ths 
operation of the vehicle be of such a reckless na. 
ture or evidence such heedlessness that the safet· 
I 
of others is in danger. Had the appellant operate.~ 
his vehicle in reckless disregard of the lives of oths1 
persons, or in such a manner as would be great!'.- , 
dangerous to the lives of others, he could hav~ 
been charged with first degree murder. Sectio~ 1 
76-30-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
Respondent respectfully directs the court's at-
tention to the case of the People v. Dunleavy, [194~1 I 
Irish Reports 95, Court of Criminal Appeals of Erie, ' 
where Justice Davitt in very clear and appropriate 
language spoke on the difference between the 
standard of action necessary to sustain a conviction 
in the face of a standard of reckless disregard for ' 
safety, as distinct from reckless disregard for life. The : 
court stated: I 
"To say that a person is driving with a reckless disre· 
1 
gard for life means that he does not care .whe~er he I 
kills anybody or not. Such a state of mmd will or· 
amarily, but perhaps not universally, amount ro gen· 
eral malice sufficient to justify a conviction for mur: 
der. To say that a person is driving with a reckles' 
disregard for the safety of others, may mean io mo:: 
than that he does not care whether or not e ~' 
them in danger. This may amount to no m~re as~ 
dangerous driving. To associate these two ide . 
'bl to un· not to achieve the desired mean, but pos~i 6 frr· 
port an ambiguity. On the other ~and, if t .~ 1~ ;11 
ence to recklessness is merely omitted, the l IJ 
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hardly given all the assistance which they are en-
titled to expect. 
This court is of the opinion that a more satisfactory 
way of indicating to a jury the high degree of negli-
gence necessary to j~stify a c~nvictioi:i f<?r man-
slaughter is to relate it to the nsk or likelihood of 
substantial personal injury resulting from it, rather 
than to attach any qualification to the word 'negli-
gence' or to the driver's disregard for the life or safe-
ty of others. In this connection the American case of 
Commonwealth v. Welansky, a decision of the Su-
preme Court of Massachusetts, is of very considerable 
interest. 
If the negligence proved is of a very high degree 
and of such a character that any reasonable driver, 
endowed with ordinary road sense and in full posses-
sion of his faculties, would realize, if he thought at 
all, that by driving in the manner which occasioned 
the fatality he was, without lawful excuse, incurring, 
in a high degree, the risk of causing substantial per-
sonal injury to others, the crime of manslaughter ap-
pears clearly to be established." 
It is submitted that this is the standard that this 
court reached in the case of State v. Berchtold. 11 
U.2d 208, 353 Pac. 183 (1960), where this court was 
first called upon to construe the requisite standard 
of the Utah Negligent Homicide Act. This court in ad-
dressing itself to the standard stated: 
"* * * Our statute only requires reckless disrega1·d 
for the safety of others, which is a much greater lack 
of care than ordinary negligence, but does not require 
a~ great ~ consciousness of the danger confronted as 
wilful misconduct required to create civil liability 
under our guest statute. To be 'reckless' does not 
require 'wilfulness' but means rather heedless, care-
less, and rash inadvertence to consequences." 
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The court made it very clear that an intentional a.cc:. 
dent or a choosing of a highly dangerous couroc 
while conscious of the danger was not required: 1 
but that the evidence must be such that, had the de- I 
fendant stopped and considered, he would ha.ve I 
realized that he had made the choice of a course 1 
marked with grave and serious dangers. T'.1e cc~'.· 
expressly said: 
"This does not require a finding that the defendan· 
was fully conscious of the great danger to others. 
It is submitted that the very clear and precise l:i.~ 
guage in the opinion of the Court of Criminal Ar ' 
peals of Erie to the effect that "any reasonable 
driver endowed with ordinary road sense and b 
full possession of his faculties would realize, if he 
thought at all," is the standard to be applied in de· i 
termining the element of consciousness. Indeed, ths 
1 
word "heedless" as used by this court in the Berc~: i 
told case implies that the operator of a vehicle neea : 
not be conscious in that he intends the accident 
1 
but might be quite indifferent to the actual dangs: 
involved. 
In State v. Park. 17 U.2d 90, 404 P.2d 677 (1965i, 
this court stated, in affirming a conviction for negl!· 
gent homicide: 
· · · baseo "The statute upon which the conVIction is ' 1 
Section 41-6-43.10, U.C.A. 1953, provides t~at, onke 
h. I rec· who causes death by driving a motor ve 1c em . h' 
less disregard of the safety of others' shall be guil · 
of negligent homicide. 
g 
The term 'reckless disregard of the safety of others' 
of course implies a much greater dereliction in hazard-
ing the safety of others ~han or~inary negligence. 
However, it does not reqmre any mtent to do harm 
either generally, or to the victim in particular. What 
is essential is that it be shown beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant drove in a manner that he 
knew, or should have known, was highly dangerous 
to others, and that he did so intentionally, or heed-
lesslv with a careless indifference to the conse-
quendes. This court has said that the 'doing of an 
act fraught with the potentiality of producing death 
amounts to such a reckless disregard for the safety 
of others' that it will justify a conviction of this 
r,rime." 
Thus, it can be seen that the standard applicable 
under the negligent homicide statute is the same as 
the standard applied under the manslaughter stat-
ute, where the individual would enact malum pro-
hibitum, smce this court required that the act be 
done in a manner which evidenced a disregard for 
the safety of others. State v. Lingman. 97 Utah 180, 91 
P.2d 457. Applying the judicial standard noted 
above, and taking the facts in a light most favorable 
to the trial court's verdict, it is submitted that the 
jury and the tnal court were both justified in con-
cluding that the evidence demonstrated a reckless 
disregard on the part of the appellant for the safety 
of others. 
The appellant, by his own admission, had trav-
eled on the road before; he knew that there was a 
stop sign at the end of the road; he knew that there 
was an intersection on which cars could be travel-
ing in an opposite direction. The stop sign was 
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visible 1,000 feet down the road. According to Mr 
Sylvester, the appellant's car approached the sto~ 
sign in a cloud of dust. Although the appellant testi- ' 
fied that he stopped at the sign, Mrs. Sylvester tesh-
fied that he did not. The testimony of the Highway 
Patrol trooper, based on the physical evidence, is 
completely contrary to the appellant's, thus iustily-
ing the jury in completely disregarding the testi-
mony of the appellant. falsus in uno, falsus in omni· 
bus. Appellant made no effort to sound his horn and 1 
must certainly have appreciated the serious danger 
that would be involved in running a stop sign. 
Further, having traveled the same road before, ap- i 
pellant was undoubtably aware of the obstructions 
to vision that would prevent him from fully viewing 
approaching traffic and prevent drivers on the main 
road from having a full view of the danger of any-
one ignoring the stop sign. The jury would have ! 
been justified in concluding that the appellant de-
liberately failed to stop at the stop sign and intended 
to travel on through, and but for the Sylvester ve· , 
hide, would have made no effort to make a full and 
1 
complete stop, as required. The whole pattern of 
driving conduct of the appellant indicates that he 
was heedless as to the consciousness of his act ar.ci 
took a course of action which recklessly endangered 
the lives of others and, in fact, brought death to a 
10-year-old school boy. 
Other decisions from this court have clearly 
found comparable fact situations to present suffi-
cient evidence to justify the jury in returning a guilty 
verdict. 
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In State v. Anderson, 100 Utah 468, 116 P.2d 398 
rJ941), a challenge was made to the sufficiency of 
the evidence, where the defendant was charged 
with involuntary manslaughter by the operation of 
a motor vehicle. This court recited the evidence as 
follows: 
"The uncontroverted evidence discloses that Ander-
son was proceeding northward on Third East. Clark 
Romney was traveling westward on Twenty First 
South, a through highway. On the southeast comer 
of the intersection and facing south was the usual 
state highway 'stop' sign. 
Mr. Silcox and Mr. Engstrom, two eyewitnesses, testi-
fied that they saw the two automobiles as they ap-
proached the intersection. Their testimony is that 
they saw Anderson enter the intersection at a speed 
of between 40 and 45 miles an hour. No stop was 
made before entering the intersection. The Anderson 
automobile collided with the Romney automobile a 
few feet north of the center of the intersection. The 
Romney automobile went up in the air five or six feet 
and rolled over twice before coming to a stop between 
the curb and sidewalk. Romney was thrown from the 
automobile and died from the injuries received." 
After reviewing the assignments of error, the court 
ruled the evidence sufficient and affirmed the con-
viction. 
Of importance in demonstrating what conduct 
is recklessly in disregard of the safety of others, th•~ 
decision of State v. Riddle. 112 Utah 356, 188 P.2d 
449 (1948), warrants consideration. In that case, this 
court affirmed a conviction of involuntary man-
slaughter. The apparent sole evidence of negli-
gence was that the appellant operated a vehicle on 
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ihe wrong side of the road. It did not appear the.r 
he had operated his vehicle for any great length ol 
time on the wrong side of the road. In discussino 
the evidence, this court stated: · 
"Whether or not it is criminal negligence to drive 
an automobile in such a manner that all or part of 
it extends over the center line of a highway must 
necessarily depend upon all of the surrounding cir-
cumstances. We do not say that in every case it j; 
criminal negligence for a driver to permit part of hi' 
vehicle to project over the center line and onto tb.t 
left hand side of the highway. Under some circum- ' 
stances such conduct might not amount to criminal 
negligence. But where a driver enters a blind curve 
in the darkness of the night, and permits his auto· 
mobile to get onto the left side of the road, and fails 
to see an automobile approaching in a lawful manner 
from the opposite direction, reasonable minds not 
only might fairly conclude that he was guilty of 
'reckless conduct or conduct evincing a marked dis-
regard for the safety of others,' but could hardly con-
clude otherwise. 
The record does not show the degree of the curve 
upon which the collision took place, nor does it indi-
cate whether or not the curve was blind. However, 
the witnesses described it as a 'bad turn,' 'a danger· 
ous curve,' 'a pronounced curve,' etc. And it is clear 
from defendan~s own testimony that he (Riddle) 
did not see the Wells vehicle until an instant before 
the crash (too late to apply the brakes or to turn 
aside). It is therefore inferable, in fact practically in· 
escapable, that either he did not see what he should 
have seen, or the curve was so blind that his range ?t 
view was very limited, and that by failing to rerna1? 
on his own side of the road he was criminally negh· 
gent." 
A case which directly sheds light on the fact 
situation presented by this appeal is State v. Barker, 
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113 Utah 514, 196 P.2d 723 (1948). In that case, the 
appellant challenged the sufficiency of the evi-
dence, as well as claims instructional error of the 
trial court. This court reversed on the grounds of 
instructional error, but ordered a new trial finding 
that the evidence was sufficient to have justified a 
ury verdict of guilty. The defendant had been 
traveling north and the victim east. The defendant 
ran a stop sign, resulting in a collision and the death 
of the occupant of the other car. The facts bear strik-
ing resemblance to those in the instant case. It was 
observed: 
"So if the driver, after carefully ascertaining that no 
traffic was approaching in the 'thru' highway, after 
he had all but completely stopped at the stop sign, 
ran down and killed a pedestrian who suddenly darted 
in front of the car, there would be no criminal negli-
gence. On the other hand, if at the time the driver 
all but completely stopped at the stop sign, there was 
traffic in the thru highway approaching so near that 
a collision could not be avoided, death from such a 
collision to a person in the car approaching on the 
thru highway would present a jury question on the 
criminal negligence of the driver of the car that all 
but completely stopped at the stop sign. So, while 
defendant is correct in his contention that the facts 
as far as they go in the illustration are the same as 
in the present case, that illustration did not con-
template the additional facts here presented, that 
when the defendant entered the intersection the other 
car ~as approaching on the thru highway so near 
that it constituted an immediate hazard and so that . ' case ts no authority for defendant's contention that 
th~ facts here do not support a finding that he was 
gwlty of criminal negligence. 
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Here it would make little difference whether he 
stopped at the stop sign or not. The fact that h 
tered this intersection at a time when anothe: en. 
h . to . car was approac mg so near as constitute an imm d" 
ate hazard made it highly dangerous to the occup~;, 
of that car regardless of whether he came to a com: 
pl.ete stop, or mer~ly slowed down or drove through 
without even slowmg down. The thing that created 
the danger was the fact that he entered the intersec-
tion when a car which had the right of way over hin1 
was approaching and that he failed to yield the righ1 
of way and thereby caused the accident. It was his 
duty under those circumstances to look and be sure 
1 
that there was no car approaching so near as to create 
an immediate hazard before he drove his car into the 
intersection. This duty in this respect was just as 
great if he came to a full stop as if he failed to stop. 
The fact that there was a stop sign should have told 
him not only that he must stop, but that if there was 
a car approaching, the driver would expect him to 
yield the right of way, and that it would be highly i 
dangerous for him to proceed into the intersection 
without first ascertaining that no car was approach· 
ing so near as to constitute an immediate hazard. If 
under these circumstances his failure to yield was the 
result of inattention on his part or because of his 
failure to observe and see in time that there was" 
car approaching on the intersectiong highway, or if he 1 
saw the approaching car in time to yield the right 
of way and failed to do so, then the jury from th?se 
facts would he justified in finding that he was ~ty 
of conduct which was reckless or in marked disre· 
gard for the safety of others. That inattention.to the 
traffic and other persons on the highway which re· 
suits in a driver's failure to avoid great danger and 
injury to others who are on the highway, has been 
repeatedly held by this court to constitute reckless· 
ness and to justify a verdict of manslaughter. See 
Sta'"- v Thatcher supra where the driver failed to 
i.c • ' ' h h u]der observe pedestrians who were walking on t e 8 0 
of the highway in front of him. State v. Newton, 
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supra, where a driver turned his vehicle into the 
course of a car approaching from the opposite direc-
tion. State v. Riddle, supra, where the driver drove 
his car around a curve partly on the wrong side of 
the highway and ran into a car approaching from 
the opposite direction. The evidence was sufficient 
to justify the court in submitting the case to the jury, 
but on account of the erroneous instructions, the 
case is reversed and remanded for a new trial." 
As can be seen from the Barker case, this court has 
ruled in a comparable fact situation to that now be-
fore the court, that the evidence justified submis-
sion of the matter to the jury for its determination. In 
the instant case, the jury had full opportunity to hear 
the witnesses, observe their demeanor on the stand, 
and judge their credibility. The facts, when taken 
in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict, clearly 
do not demonstrate that the jury and the trial judqe 
were unreasonable men. There is no basis for a 
reversal. 
CONCLUSION 
In the instant case, the matter of the appellant's 
guilt was clearly presented to the jury on a cleor 
and unobstructed presentation of the facts. No ex-
ceptions to the trial court's instructions were taken 
by the appellant. The jury was, therefore, clearly 
apprised of the law and weighed the conduct of the 
appellant as against the requisite legal standard. 
The facts, when viewed in a light most favorable to 
the iury's verdict, justify the conclusion the jury 
reached and support the trial court's judgment. 
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There is no basis for reversal. This court shci~;:: 
affirm. 
Respectfully submitted. 
PHIL L. HANSE:t-; 
Attorney General 
RONALD N. BOYCE 
Assistant Attorney Genera: 
Attorneys for Respondent 
